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Abstract 
 
Dual-process theories classify a fast, automatic “System 1” and a deliberative, controlled 
“System 2” as distinct mechanisms driving human behavior. Several recent studies have used a 
classic experimental economics scenario, the public goods game (PGG), to link these systems 
with participants’ tendency to act cooperatively. This research attempts to measure patterns of 
intuition and reflection by tracking an individual’s decision time when donating to a common 
pool. These donations are multiplied by the experimenter and then redistributed equally among 
the group. Some authors find that cooperative participants make fast decisions, arguing that 
cooperation is thus intuitive. Meanwhile, other authors find the opposite correlation, claiming 
that selfishness is intuitive. Our analysis critiques both views by offering an alternative 
explanation, which is that response time results are driven by the cost of being cooperative. Here 
we test this hypothesis using data collected from a series of publications on the PGG. These 
findings provide evidence for our “strength of preference” hypothesis, namely that cooperation is 
fast when it is low cost and attractive, while cooperation is slow when it is high cost and 
unattractive. Therefore, we conclude that fast decision times can indicate individual preferences 
for varying donation efficiencies. These results offer a coherent story to a large body of 
seemingly incoherent findings. 
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“Human behavior stems from three sources: desire, emotion, & knowledge.”  
- Plato 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement.  But the opposite of a profound truth 
may well be another profound truth.” 
- Niels Bohr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Don’t hate the player, hate the game.”  
- Ice T 
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1. Introduction 
 
A foundation of economics research argues for an instinctively selfish model of human behavior 
– one in which we must overcome our own egotistic motives in order to cooperate with another 
person.  An emerging body of research claims that acting prosocially, rather, is the automatic 
behavior in social dilemmas and thus we are required to deliberate on our initial decisions to 
make the more selfish choice.  This research is backed by data on reaction times (RTs), which 
measure the length of time a player will take to perceive, consider, and select a choice option.  
However, contradictions in the two claims described above have led to skepticism about the 
assumptions formed from using such methods.  Are the RT claims generated from many 
experimental economics studies valid, or does there exist an alternate explanation for the 
asymmetries in their results?   Moreover, how can we interpret RT data to better understand the 
processes involved in strategic decision making? 
In recent decades, several prominent studies in the field of behavioral economics have 
linked RT with the dual-system model of behavior.  This category of decision modeling, referred 
to more generally as dual-process theory, claims that choice behavior is a function of two 
systems: a rapid, intuitive decision process and its slower, deliberative counterpart (Kahneman, 
2003).  A central question in the exploration of this theory is how to interpret RT data in the 
context of social preferences.  Although pervasive in the domain of experimental economics, 
social preferences take on a variety of forms in different game settings.  Two general 
classifications of these preferences are 1) “egotistic” or “selfish”, and 2) “cooperative” or “pro-
social”.   In most cases, a selfish player is more concerned with maximizing their own payoff 
than that of the group or their opponent.  Meanwhile, a player who is prosocial will typically 
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select the option that is “fairest”, the reciprocal action, or (in rare cases) the option that 
maximizes the opponent’s payoff  (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
The variability in these settings can be traced back to experimental parameters, 
differences in task experience, priming effects, and incentive structures, among other variables.  
Noisy data especially complicates the analysis of RT studies in comparison to its impact on 
traditional procedural decision models.  For example, failing to control for subjective value 
differences between and within individual games can create pseudo-correlations in players’ RT 
patterns (Krajbich et al., 2015).  Another difficulty is that a single reasoning process may 
actually direct choices, and in this case decision conflict is driven by exogenous factors, such as 
perceived differences in the choice set (Osman, 2004) rather than endogenous dual-system 
processes.  Choice models such as the drift-diffusion model of behavior predict that an 
individual’s strength of preference and RT are inversely related, and this means that longer RTs 
signify preferences which are closer to indifference between two options in a choice set (Chabris 
et al., 2008).   Nonetheless, several groups of experimenters have used RT data to define fast 
behaviors as intuitive processes, and slower behaviors as deliberative.  Many empirical studies 
have accepted this reasoning, and hence many of these authors interpret patterns in RT data as 
evidence that the players making the fastest choices are significantly more cooperative in game 
settings, while the slower group can be classified as selfish.  Yet, other authors have produced 
data that leads to the opposite conclusion: egotistic players choose more quickly and their 
prosocial counterparts are on the slower side. 
 These starkly different claims prompt two important questions that I will answer in this 
meta-analysis:  
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i) How might we account for such heterogeneity in the empirical evidence with a single 
model?  For example, the strength-of-preference model proposed by Krajbich et al. (2015) 
predicts separate RT trends across different game parameters, even within the same group of 
participants.  This is because it takes overall contribution rates into account.  
ii) What does this imply for our interpretation of RT data in future studies?  Experimental 
evidence from the field of psychology has long utilized RT data, and behavioral economics 
research has only more recently explored this variable within existing paradigms of economic 
behavior.  Future directions for RT studies are likely to include work in neuroeconomics, and 
thus it is crucial that researchers are equipped with an accurate method for interpreting the data. 
 
1.1 Origins of a Dual-Process Theory 
 
 The first known speculations of a dual process theory began nearly a century ago, with 
Sigmund Freud’s proposed distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ processes of the mind.   
The former suggested that a system of unconscious thought was responsible for the repressed 
desires and impulses brought to fruition in dreams, while the latter operated by a more logical, 
rational framework during consciousness (Freud, 1921).  Freud describes the primary process as 
one that is initially present in a living being, whereas the components of the secondary process 
develop over its lifetime.  Such a theory was not without flaws, especially in the domain of 
evolutionary biology (Epstein, 1994), though updates to the two-system idea did not surface until 
the late twentieth century.  Cognitive-experiential self theory (CEST) provided evidence of both 
an “automatic” and a “rational” mode of thought (Epstein, 1994) through numerous examples 
such as conflicting assessments between “the head and the heart”, obtaining information from 
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textbooks versus acquiring knowledge from experience, and including anecdotes in order to 
effectively (and affectively) convey a particular message (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Others 
brought updates to the theory by investigating a rivalrous nature between the systems of intuitive 
and analytic thinking (Hammond, 1996) and adding characteristics to distinguish the two types 
of cognitive processing (Stanovich and West, 2000), as shown in Figure 1 (from Kahneman, 
2003), below. 
 Note here that Daniel Kahneman, who is credited with developing and refining the two-
system view (2003), or “dual-process theory” as it is often referred to today, originally defined 
the fast, automatic “System 1” decisions as impressions: perceptual and rather involuntary.  
Contrarily, decisions under the domain of “System 2” were better described as judgments: 
intentional, deliberative, and controlled (Kahneman, 2003).  The magnitude of control System 2 
exhibits (given a range of decisions) can vary substantially, however.  Often an individual will 
display judgments that resemble our perceptual state of mind, and the term “intuitive” is applied 
to these choices.  
 
Figure 1 | Characteristics of Systems 1 & 2 (from Kahneman 2003) 
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 More recently, authors have provided their own classifications of what an “intuitive” 
response might be in an experimental economics setting (Rubenstein, 2007; DiGuida and 
Devetag, 2013).  These include, but are certainly not limited to: steps to reaching Nash 
Equilibrium, strategy of selfish individuals, strategy that leads to a fair outcome, strategy that 
yields the highest payoff for an individual, or a strategy with the lowest variance across an 
individual’s chosen outcomes.  Given the variability of tasks and games used in social dilemma 
experiments, defining an instinctive response to a choice set will vary greatly across contexts 
(Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2015).  Attempts to further define an intuitive response in various 
social dilemma scenarios has sparked a recent debate among authors who use reaction times 
(RTs) as an indicator of dual-system framework.    We will explore these specific RT studies in 
depth throughout the remainder of this analysis. 
 
1.2 The Reverse Inference Critique 
 
 Use of RT measurements in behavioral experiments dates back to before the existence of 
the dual process theory described above (Donders,1868).  However, the vast majority of this 
research literature is concentrated in the field of cognitive psychology (Spiliopoulos and 
Ortmann, 2015), rather than economics.  Past researchers in the domain of experimental 
economics have even speculated that choice-maximizing behavior is independent of an 
individual’s decision making process, and hence, their RT (Friedman and Savage, 1948; 
Friedman, 1953).  Decades later, others argued the opposite mechanism, in which decision-
making processes play a substantial role in choice outcomes (Simon, 1976, 1986).  Perhaps more 
importantly, these and later authors claim that optimal or rational decision behavior is not only a 
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function of choice outcome, but of the associated parameters and their adapted decision 
processes (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
Current dual-process theory literature often employs RT measurements of players in 
various social dilemma scenarios in order to explore these decision-making processes.  The 
framework underlying such experiments has led several authors to the conclusion that RT allows 
us to classify choices as “intuitive” System 1 reactions when they are fast, and “deliberative” 
System 2 responses when they are slow.  Yet, social scientists must use caution in applying this 
inference within the domain of RT. While dual-process theory does suggest that an automatic 
process will occur faster than its deliberative counterpart, the reverse argument is not necessarily 
true.  A more specific explanation of this conclusion, termed a reverse inference, is given by 
Krajbich et al. (2015) as follows: 
 
There is a key distinction between the prediction that an automatic process will 
occur faster than more deliberative computations, and the classification of a choice as 
intuitive or automatic because it happens more quickly. 
 
Keeping this warning in mind, I attempt to resolve the conflict posed by contradictions in 
previous RT experiments by analyzing the same data after controlling for subjective value 
differences.  In the next section, I provide a more detailed outline of the relevant RT asymmetries 
found in the empirical literature, as well as an updated paradigm for existing data.   The 
methodology and results in sections three and four expose our criteria for inclusion, data 
collection processes, and calculations for the included variables.  Finally, the fifth section 
highlights additional details of the included studies, as well as future directions and limitations 
for RT research.  
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2. Empirical Background 
 
2.1 Overview of Dual-Process Model Asymmetries 
 
 Shortly after the formation of Kahneman’s dual-process theory in the late twentieth 
century, models of human decision-making in behavioral economics literature began to form 
extrapolations of a dual-system model in game theory settings.  One of the first original 
experiments to expand on the concept of measuring RT used thousands of responses from an 
online decision game in order to further explore the role of RT on choice behavior (Rubenstein, 
2007).  Originally, Rubenstein formed three classifications for players’ actions in social decision-
making scenarios: cognitive, instinctive, or reasonless.  He explicitly states that these were 
assigned intuitively, and likewise, the RT of an intuitive action is shorter when compared to its 
cognitive counterpart.  Hence, experimental economics literature began to further analyze 
prosocial behavior using players’ RT patterns in strategic game settings (Rand, Greene, & 
Nowak, 2012; Evans, Dillon, & Rand 2014; Lotito, Migheli, & Ortona, 2013; Branas-Garza, 
2007; Cappelan 2014; Nielsen et al. 2014; Recalde et al. 2014).  Although many of these 
researchers have produced robust relationships between RT and contribution rates in games such 
as the public goods game, their methods for employing RT may be unsuitable for making explicit 
inferences about the decision process.   
The standard linear public goods game (PGG) is played among four or more individuals; 
each of the n players is endowed with an equal number of y tokens that they may either keep for 
themselves or invest some number of tokens, gi , in a central fund (0 ≤	𝑔$ 	≤ 𝑦)	.  After the 
players have simultaneously allocated their tokens, the central fund is multiplied by a pre-
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determined factor, often called the ‘multiplier’.  The resulting amount is redistributed equally 
among the four players.  The term ‘marginal per capita return’ (mPCR) refers to the fraction of a 
player’s initial allocation to the group, a, that is returned to him or her at the conclusion of the 
game (see Figure 2, A1 of Appendix, for further details).  Hence, a representative payoff 
function (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) is as follows: 
 
(1)    𝜋$(  = y – gi + a 𝑔)*+,( , 
       0 <	a	< 1  
         
For example, PGG studies in this analysis typically use payoff functions of the following 
form: 
 
(2)   𝜋$(  = 40  – gi + 0.5 𝑔)-+,(  
 
in which group size is four players, initial individual allocation is 40 tokens, the multiplier is 
two, and the mPCR value is thus 0.5.  In this particular instance, the sum of all contributions is 
given by ∑gj and each individual’s mPCR is 0.5 tokens per token contributed.  Standard 
assumptions of economic behavior predict that individuals will free-ride, or allocate zero of their 
initial tokens to the group fund; this is the dominant strategy for the PGG.  Decades of of PGG 
and game theory research suggest other motives, however. 
Experimenters model players’ decision processes with ideas from dual-process theory to 
provide further rationale for prosocial and selfish motives.  These models largely assume that 
decisions can be labeled as intuitive or deliberative given the players’ RT distribution.  For 
 
 
10 
example, a recent experiment (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012) found faster subjects contributing 
more on average in public goods games, and thus the authors conclude that people overall may 
have a predisposition to act cooperatively.  Likewise, Lotito et al. (2013) employ RT data during 
the PGG in a similar fashion, arguing that as RTs decrease, the action of a player becomes more 
intuitive. While the authors note that average RTs are similar across groups, they find: i) a 
negative correlation between RT and contribution, and ii) decreased contributions in later rounds 
of the game.    Cappelan et al. (2014) notes that players seem to have an instinctive drive to act 
fairly in Dictator Games.  Once more, this inference is drawn from the idea that participants who 
chose fair divisions of the allocation in Dictator Games had significantly shorter RTs than those 
who chose the selfish option. These studies claim humans are therefore predisposed to act fairly 
and infer that a fast response implies an intuitive action. 
On the contrary, several researchers (Lohse, Goeschel, & Diederich, 2014; Piovesan & 
Wengstron, 2009; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014; Fielder et al. 2013; Tinghog, 2013; Kuss 
et al., 2015) claim that since egoistic choices are fast, these choices are thus “intuitive”.   Lohse 
et al. (2014) describe cooperative choices as being associated with deliberative processes, as 
participants who contribute the least make the quickest decisions in a binary PGG scenario.  The 
study does emphasize the idea that type and context of a public good may drive differences in 
contribution rates, which is discussed here in later sections.  In a series of high, low, and mixed 
inequality Dictator Games, individuals make faster decisions when these maximize their own 
payoffs, rather than display preferences for prosociality (Piovesan and Wengstrom, 2009).  
Furthermore, their results show that faster subjects overall tend to make more egoistic choices.  
Fiedler (2013) uses a Social Value Orientation (SVO) slider and eye-tracking to compare their 
results.  A version of the SVO slider is included in the appendix of this document (see A2, 
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Figure 3) for further reference.  They report that as players indicate higher levels of prosociality 
on the SVO slider, their RTs in the one-shot and repeated PGG also increase.  
Evans, Dillion, & Rand (2013) look further into the inconsistent RT literature results 
using a prisoner’s dilemma, one-shot PGG and repeated PGG.  They test a hypothesis that 
decision conflict, defined by the authors as an unclear preference for any particular option in a 
social dilemma, drives longer RTs.  The series of experiments indeed displays evidence for an 
inverted-U pattern of RTs, meaning that decisions classified as “extremely” prosocial or selfish 
will have the shortest RTs, and players who make more intermediate contribution decisions take 
the longest to decide.  While this study represents an important step towards correctly 
interpreting RT patterns, it reveals an additional caveat in the experimental design: RT 
differences may depend on not only the subjects we have, but the questions we ask.   
Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr (2015) were the first to investigate this problem by 
purposefully altering experimental parameters in social-preference and intertemporal choice 
paradigms.   They replicate the PGG experiment by Rand et al. (2012), but include two other 
mPCR values in addition to the value used in the original study design (0.5).  Furthermore, they 
hypothesize that contributions and RTs are positively correlated when overall contribution rates 
are below 50%, and likewise, they predict a negative correlation between contribution and RT 
when the overall amount is above 50%.  By creating different levels of group benefit, they show 
that varying the attractiveness of contributing to the group fund does indeed alter average 
contribution rates.  Participants contributed an average of 25%, 47%, and 63% in the 0.3, 0.5, 
and 0.9 mPCR rounds, respectively.  Moreover, the faster half of participants in the 0.3 condition 
contribute less than the slower half; this trend is also seen in the 0.5 condition.  The 0.9 condition 
is also consistent with the original hypothesis, as the faster half of participants instead contribute 
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more than the slower half.  Namely, these results support the authors’ strength-of-preference 
account, rather than a dual process account which predicts either strictly positive or strictly 
negative correlations between contribution and RT in all three cases.   
  
2.2 The Case for Preferences and Parameters  
 
While reaction times can offer valuable insights on choice behavior, these are more 
accurate in scenarios where players’ perceptions of choice similarity are properly accounted for. 
The majority of dual-process explanations assume that RTs from a single choice function allow 
us to extrapolate an individual’s temporal decision behavior as a causal explanation in any given 
choice scenario.  Given the inconsistency in current RT data, this assumption would be largely 
inaccurate, and yet many dual process accounts support a strictly negative or positive correlation 
between contribution and RT.  How, then, can we account for the asymmetry in RT results?  
Such a framework places too little weight on the parameters of the initial choice scenario, and 
hence, fails to encompass the average perceived utility of the choice for the group as a whole.  
Our strength-of-preference explanation offers a more cohesive explanation for the link between 
RT and prosociality.  We hypothesize that participants’ RTs are correlated instead with the 
parameters of a social dilemma, given their baseline preference for prosociality.  A concrete 
example of this choice process is as follows: 
Consider a scenario in which we observe a group of individuals at a department faculty 
meeting.  The meeting takes place midmorning on the same day each week, and faculty members 
take turns bringing coffee and juice and preparing it before the meeting begins.  We assume that 
half of the group usually prefers to drink coffee while the other half prefers juice. One day the 
group realizes that the person responsible for bringing coffee is away at a conference, so they 
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have to brew some stale, generic coffee from the back of the cupboard.  Most of the group 
decides right away to drink the juice instead, though a few sleep deprived researchers go for 
coffee after quite a bit more deliberation than usual.  The next week, however, everyone is 
pleasantly surprised to find a full espresso bar set up in the meeting room to welcome guest 
faculty members visiting the university.  This time, the (still) sleep-deprived coffee-lovers have 
cappuccinos before most people have even walked in the door, and most of the department 
follows eagerly behind.  Even those few who still go for the juice hesitate before doing so. 
 Now, from the perspective of one of the visiting professors, it may appear that this 
particular department has an unusually high affinity for caffeine.  On the other hand, if the same 
professor had been present a week before, they may have come to the opposite conclusion.  Both 
scenarios involve a person’s own taste preferences, and the degree to which the coffee actually 
looks appealing.  When the coffee offered is cheap, the non-coffee individuals have no trouble 
deciding to turn it down, but the coffee-lovers make a decision much later.  The reverse is true 
when the expensive coffee is presented.  Note that coffee-drinkers do not always make a decision 
quickly, just as non-coffee drinkers do not always choose slowly, and vice-versa. 
We can apply a similar framework to our PGG design.  Let us assume that on average, 
50% of participants exemplify selfish behavior (donating less than half of their private fund to 
the group) and 50% display prosocial behavior (donating more than half).  Moreover, when the 
parameters of the PGG are closely aligned with either group’s preferences, the individuals in that 
group are quicker to make a choice about their allocation to the group fund (Krajbich, 2015).  
For instance, versions of the PGG where participants may be disposed towards selfishness will 
likely show that those with a preference for selfish behavior have shorter RTs.  The opposite is 
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true for a game with higher group benefit, in which the participants who are more prosocial on 
average are expected to have shorter RTs. 
 Based on this idea, I aim to separate studies based on their average contribution rates.  
Note that a cooperation rate of 0.5 is representative of a player who allocates half of his or her 
initial private amount to the group fund; in other words, this particular player is halfway between 
completely selfish (free-riding) and completely prosocial.  An average cooperation rate below 
0.5 can be attributed to studies with lower-group benefit, and we hypothesize that players who 
contribute less than the average amount will make quicker decisions in this scenario.  Similarly, 
studies with an average cooperation rate above 0.5 suggest that the group benefit is higher, 
making contributing a more attractive option.  Participants who contribute more than average 
will then make faster decisions here. 
Few authors implement this framework when using the RT methodology described 
previously, though recent experimental economics studies have begun to critique reverse 
inference claims based on RT asymmetries reported in the literature (Krajbich et al, 2015; Kuss 
et al., 2015). Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2015) characterize dual process models as “descriptive” 
models of behavior, rather than procedural, whereas the latter category implies that an explicit 
mechanism exists for switching between the two systems.  For instance, dual process theory 
suggests that System 2 overrides System 1 (Kahneman, 2011).  Any variance in how this process 
occurs, due to cognitive load, time constraint, etc., may partially account for the contradictions 
within empirical findings. In order to address the variability in the current literature, we 
conducted a comprehensive analysis with the following objectives: (1) to find a standardized 
measure for the independent variable of contribution level with the available data; (2) to 
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investigate and quantify any existing correlation between RTs and contribution rates in previous 
experiments; and (3) to explore parameters that influence these effects.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
 This analysis looks at the relationship between group levels of prosociality and log-
transformed reaction times. Pooling data across 15 studies, we assess a total of 9341 individual 
decisions.  
 
3.1 Criteria for inclusion 
 
We compile data from 15 different public goods games. Our dataset covers studies in 
which subjects (i) decided whether to incur some private cost to provide a greater group benefit, 
(ii) were separated into groups by decision time in which (iii) they were not subject to constraints 
or delays during the decision-making process.  Next, we investigate reported patterns between 
log reaction time data and mean contributions.  
 The meta-analysis excluded studies that examined reaction times under time-pressure or 
time-delay scenarios (Rand et al., 2012; Tinghog et al., 2013).  While studies in these categories 
can be valuable in examining interactions between RT and prosociality, previous work suggests 
that any form of time-constraints may alter the amount of information acquired or processed.  
Additionally, even perceiving some type of time pressure can impact choice behavior when it is 
not explicitly imposed in the experimental setting (Benson, 1993).  Also, the meta-analysis 
excluded studies using forms of social dilemmas (i.e. Trust Games, Ultimatum Games, etc.) that 
 
 
16 
did not allow players to make simultaneous contribution decisions or use arbitrary measures of 
prosociality that cannot be measured on a discrete scale of contribution decisions. While the 
original search criteria did not exclude Dictator Games, the available experiments did not employ 
an independent variable that fit the standardized contribution scale.  A flow diagram of the 
criteria is given below, in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 | Flow diagram of the eligible studies.  
Publications initially identified in 
Google Scholar (n =1725)
Excluded: 
Qualitative, 
Not accessible  
Time-pressure/time-delay,
Mixed-strategy game 
Studies selected for further 
screening (n = 24)
Excluded: 
Dependent variable unavailable 
Multiple contribution decisions, Dictator Games
Studies to be considered for 
inclusion (n= 17)
Excluded: under review 
(data not available)
Studies included in meta-analysis 
(n=15)
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3.2 Information sources and search 
We first performed a Google Scholar search using the keywords dual-process, reaction-
time, response-time, public goods game, and dictator game, either alone or in combination with 
another term from the list.   Studies were included from the first available date until November 1, 
2015.   
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
 We developed an electronic data sheet, extracted data from literature and supplementary 
material when available, and directly contacted authors for additional values that were needed in 
the analysis.  Data collection was conducted for the first time in January of 2015, was refined in 
July of 2015, and updated in October of 2015.   
 
3.4 Study characteristics 
 
All of the included studies (Table 1) were some variation of the standard linear PGG.  
However, in relation to contribution level, the asymmetry among the results of reaction-time 
studies remains notable and persistent.  While some authors claim that fast responses correlate 
with higher contributions (i.e. ‘prosocial’ behavior), others show a correlation between fast 
responses and lower contributions.  These studies also vary in terms of cost to contribution via 
their mPCR values: a lower mPCR, for instance, makes contributing to the group costlier for the 
individual than a higher mPCR. To account for this framework, we have used each study’s mean 
contribution percentage (scaled from 0-1) as the independent variable.  This range of 
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contribution values controls for the cost of contributing in each study.  Our hypothesis suggests 
that studies with overall contribution rates below 0.5 will also display positive correlations 
between reaction time and contribution; studies with overall contribution rates above 0.5 will 
display negative correlations between reaction time and contribution.  The selected studies also 
include data with which we or the authors have calculated a regression coefficient of log(RT) on 
contribution level, and this value serves as the dependent variable, as shown in Table 2.  Here, 
we provide further detail on the experimental parameters of each and outline calculations for 
inclusion in the meta-analysis. 
 
1st Author Year N Experimental Conditions 
Format Choice mPCR Other variables 
Rand  2012 212  One-shot Continuous 0.5  
192 Repeated Continuous 0.5 Reward/punishment  
256 One-shot Continuous 0.5 Priming 
338 One-shot Continuous 0.5 Daily life interactions 
72 One-shot Continuous 0.5  
Fiedler  2013 38 One-shot Continuous 0.6 SVO slider 
Lotito  2013 253 Repeated Continuous 0.5 Priming 
Lohse  2014 3484 One-shot Binary -  
3484 One-shot Binary -  
Evans 2014 
 
156 One-shot Continuous 0.5  
28 Repeated Continuous 0.5  
303 One-shot Incremental 0.5  
Krajbich 2015 175 One-shot Continuous 0.3  
175 One-shot Continuous 0.5  
175 One-shot Continuous 0.9  
 
Table 1 | Game format and variables among selected PGG studies. 
Notes: mPCR – marginal per capita return.  Source: Author data. 
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To begin, we include three experiments from Rand et al. 2012, with the first (Table 2, A) 
being a standard one-shot PGG (recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, [ATurk]) between 
four players, each endowed with $0.40.  The players answered two comprehension questions 
regarding their understanding of payoff structure and were then allowed to proceed with the 
game.  Each player could donate any fraction of their allocation to the group fund, where it 
would then be doubled and re-divided evenly among the four players.   If ci = individual 
contribution to group and n = number of subjects, our contribution value was calculated with the 
following function: 
 
(3)      C = ∑
./	*  
 
The mean contribution level was reported as 23.83 cents; this value was divided by the total 
possible contribution level (40 cents) to obtain our standardized contribution value of 0.5958. 
However, whereas in the original publication, the authors log10-transform decision-times to 
obtain the regression coefficient, we requested log-transformed (i.e. natural log) decision-times 
directly from the authors to include in this analysis.  As previously noted, we consider prosocial 
individuals to be those who contribute above the study’s mean contribution level.   
In the same publication, Rand et al. also utilize a PGG experiment with the option to 
reward/punish other players (B) and that frames players’ actions by requiring them to write a 
paragraph to promote or inhibit intuition, prior to playing the game.  The rest of the experiment 
was identical to the PGG described above. Finally, the authors include a version where players 
rank how cooperative they rank their daily life interaction-partners to be (D).  The authors use 
the same game format and include a post-experimental questionnaire in which they ask players, 
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“To what extent do you feel you can trust other people that you interact with in your daily life?” 
using a 10-point Likert scale from “1, very little” to “10, very much”.  Finally, a supplemental 
study (E) from the Harvard CLER laboratory is included in which authors use the same PGG 
framework as the studies conducted with MTurk.  Again, we obtain mean contribution value and 
the log-transformed regression coefficients directly from author data for each of the three studies 
above.  
A later study by Evans et al. (2014) uses both a one-shot PGG (H) and repeated PGG (I) 
with two separate pools of participants from the Harvard CLER.  The study participants could 
contribute between 0 and 400 points to the group fund, where it was doubled and redistributed 
evenly. This publication also uses a sample of participants from MTurk (J), but the PGG 
experimental design differs slightly from previously discussed studies in that they use radio 
buttons to contribute between 0 and 40 cents (in ten cent increments).  Contributions were given 
to partners and then doubled. The mean contribution levels and reaction time coefficients were 
obtained from the authors for each of the three PGG; only the 1st round of the repeated study was 
used in this analysis for consistency.   
Krajbich et. al. (2015) use a PGG format in which they vary the mPCR value over a 
series of three trials. Players were given an initial allocation of 40 points and allowed to allocate 
any fraction of this amount to the central fund.   They made one decision at each mPCR value: 
0.3, 0.5, and 0.9 (M, N, and O, respectively).  The authors regressed logarithm of reaction time 
on contribution rate to obtain the value reported in Table 2 (the log-transformed coefficients 
were not directly reported in the original article).  Further, the mean contribution rates for each of 
the three conditions were taken from the original work. 
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Lohse et al. (2014) employ a PGG scenario through a large-scale online experiment (F). 
In their design, participants make a binary choice between a monetary reward (randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution between 2-100 units of currency) and the elimination of 1 metric ton 
of CO2 emissions.  In this case, elimination of pollution is the pro-social choice.  Each 
participant made two separate decisions, and both are represented here.  The authors include a 
multivariate OLS regression of their RT data in which they control for potential confounds.    
They regress logarithm of reaction time on binary contribution decision given the various 
treatment conditions described above.  Additionally, the study broke down decisions into four 
categories of very fast, fast, slow, and very slow.  Mean contribution rates and regression 
coefficient values for log(RT) were taken directly from the literature results (with demographic 
controls included).  
  Lotito et al. (2013) assigned four treatment groups that combined the following scenarios: 
a) players either were i) acquainted before the experiment or ii) had no previous acquaintance, 
and b) players i) performed team work or ii) engaged in cheap talk directly before the 
experiment.  The team work involved performing a budget analysis and report on three different 
companies.  The cheap talk treatment asked players to chat for 20 minutes. The groups played a 
standard PGG with four players/group and an initial endowment of 60 experimental monetary 
units (EMUs); each EMU was worth 0.01 _.  The participants each decided which fraction of the 
initial amount they wanted to contribute to the group fund, and the sum of these was doubled and 
redistributed evenly among the four participants.  Unlike the studies previously discussed, this 
experiment (F) was a repeated PGG over ten rounds.  The contribution levels were calculated 
using Equation 3 with the contribution means for each group, which are provided in the original 
publication.  However, while the regression coefficient included does regress reaction time on 
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contribution level, it is important to note here that this is a panel tobit regression, and it does not 
employ log-transformed reaction times.  We were unable to obtain this particular regression 
coefficient from the authors. 
Fiedler et. al (2013) use a Social Value Orientation (SVO) measure (see Figure 4, A2 of 
Appendix), in combination with eye-tracking, to measure contribution decisions in a 3-person 
PGG (G).  Each participant was endowed with 20 points and instructed to decide how much to 
contribute, ci, to the group fund.  All contributions to the fund, cj, were multiplied by 1.8 and 
shared equally between all participants.  They calculate final payoffs using a payoff function for 
a three-person linear PGG: 
 
(5)    Payoff = (20 – ci) + (1.8 x 
∑.12 ) 
 
Since the mean contribution of the one-shot PGG was not explicitly stated in this study, we 
calculated this value, as well as the value for logRT on contribution, using author-provided data.  
 
IV. Results 
 
In this analysis, we examine existing dual-process literature with respect to the RT 
inferences made in the above studies.  It is worth noting that experiments certainly differ in their 
explicit payoffs to the participant, but other factors, such as instructions, priming effects, etc. 
also influence the perceived cost of a given contribution decision.  Our analysis is conducted 
using linear regression taking the correlation between log reaction time and prosociality as the 
dependent variable. Mean contribution amount (Table 2) is measured as percentage donation of 
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the players’ initial allotment in each individual study. The mean contribution is standardized on a 
0-1 scale where 0 represents maximum selfishness or free-riding, and 1 is equivalent to 
maximum prosociality or full cooperation.  We employ mean contribution percentages to 
measure the perceived “cost” of contribution for varying game parameters.  For example, a 
contribution percentage of 0.2 implies that game participants viewed the decision to contribute 
(i.e. the prosocial option) as less attractive on average than the more selfish option.  Conversely, 
a mean contribution percentage of 0.8 would imply that prosocial behavior in a given choice 
scenario is less costly to the average participant.  
 
Table 2 | Regression Data: Contribution values and reaction time coefficients, by study.  
 µc = mean contribution (percentage value)  
*Lohse et. al randomly drew a monetary amount between €2-€100; each participant was given a choice 
between a public goods contribution (i.e. reducing one metric ton of CO2 emissions) or receipt of the 
random monetary reward.   
 
Study 
 
µcontribution 
 
Coefficient 
 
N 
 
1stAuthor 
 
Year 
 
Other notes 
 
A 0.5958 -0.3683 212 Rand 2012 Study 1 
B 0.7115 -0.3334 192 Rand 2012 Study 5, reward/punishment 
C 0.6146 -0.2453 256 Rand 2012 Study 9, priming 
D 0.5965 -0.225 338 Rand 2012 Study 10, daily life interactions 
E 0.5104 -0.3806 72 Rand 2012 Supplemental study, CLER lab 
F 0.553 -0.129* 1152 Lotito 2013 Priming 
G 0.536  0.1661 36 Fiedler 2013 Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
H 0.447 -0.022 156 Evans 2014 Study 2 
I 0.705 -0.355 28 Evans 2014 Study 3, 1st of repeated PGG 
J 0.556  0.027 303 Evans 2014 Study 4, Mturk  
K 0.1751  0.371 3484 Lohse 2014 Round 1 
L 0.2312  0.124 3484 Lohse 2014 Round 2 
M 0.25  0.609 175 Krajbich 2015 mPCR = 0.3 
N 0.48  0.1751 175 Krajbich 2015 mPCR = 0.5 
O 0.63 -0.1872 175 Krajbich 2015 mPCR = 0.9 
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          We find a negative Pearson correlation between author-reported regression values (logRT 
on prosociality) and mean contribution rates (r = -0.81), as shown in Figure 5.  The coefficient 
of the regression value is more positive in the case of smaller group contributions, and hence 
more negative as the size of the group contribution increases.  This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that studies with overall contribution rates below 0.5 will also display positive 
correlations between reaction time and contribution; studies with overall contribution rates above 
0.5 will display negative correlations between reaction time and contribution. 
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Figure 5 | Graphical representation reaction time coefficients and standardized average contribution rates 
All regression values (logdecisiontime on mean contribution percentage) provided by authors. Data points scaled to 
number of study participants (see Table 1).  ‘Prosociality’ defined as donating above the mean contribution in a 
given study (see Table 2). Pearson correlation = -0.81; Spearman correlation = -0.70. Graphic constructed with 
ggplot2 (H. Wickham, 2009).  
 
 As shown above, we resolve some of the discrepancy in RT literature by modifying the 
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into account.  This is consistent with our initial hypothesis that reaction times increase 
proportionally with increased cost of a particular choice. 
 
V. Discussion 
 
 The result of this analysis suggests that there is no general correlation between RT and a 
player’s tendency to choose the prosocial option.  We do, however, accommodate for group 
preferences and parameters of each study by controlling for utility differences across subject 
populations.  In groups that can be described as prosocial (contributing > 50% allocation to 
group fund on average) overall, the average corresponding reaction time is lower for players who 
chose the prosocial option in a respective decision scenario.  Likewise, studies with group 
contribution averages on the selfish end of the spectrum (< 50% allocation to group fund) display 
decreased average RTs for players selecting the more selfish option.   
One apparent conclusion from our findings is that the parameters of a choice paradigm 
may have substantial and relevant impacts on the timing and outcome of participant behavior.  
Beyond the strength of preference argument, these include task instructions, measures of group 
vs. individual benefit (i.e. mPCR), population type, accessibility, and other game format 
alterations. Information regarding a particular choice can be made more or less accessible due to 
factors such as stimulus salience, selective attention by the individual, and activation of a 
behavioral or cognitive response via priming (Higgins, 1996).  It is critically important to keep in 
mind, then, that any minor alteration in an experimental design can invoke drastic changes in the 
behavior of participants who complete the experiment.  For example, phrases in the instructions 
or “practice” examples (often used in social dilemma games) may play a large role in framing the 
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decisions of a person who is unfamiliar with that game.  One study hypothesizes that participants 
with cooperative daily-life settings/partners will act cooperatively in a PGG and hence have 
shorter RT (Rand, et al., 2012).  A subsequent PGG study by the same authors uses a priming 
task: before playing the game, the experimenters ask participants to either promote or inhibit 
intuition by writing a short paragraph corresponding to their group. This condition also shows 
evidence of shorter RTs for higher cooperation rates.  Other studies use priming and do conclude 
that the behavior of the players depends on the framing of the situation (Branas-Garza, 2006; 
Lotito et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2014; Rand & Kraft-Todd, 2014).  On the contrary, another group 
of researchers has participants chose between a random monetary reward and elimination of CO2 
emissions, and the faster choices fall proportionally towards the selfish option (Lohse et al., 
2014).  The authors claim that these results highlight two important factors in the experimental 
design: first, that the mPCR for climate protection is, in theory, lower than that of a direct 
monetary reward as it is split between a large number of beneficiaries.  Further, that this choice 
scenario eliminates the aspect of strategic uncertainty that occurs in the standard PGG: 
participants have complete control over their own payoff, other than the random monetary 
amount.  This research also raises the notion that future work in economics that aims to focus on 
decision processes should measure the extent to which experimental parameters impact 
individual preferences, a concept I have analyzed here.  
This analysis does not include time-pressure or delay data in the results, though our 
warning against reverse-inference claims still holds true for such models. Verkoeijen and 
Bouwmeester (2014) examine patterns of cooperation in a series of time pressure and forced 
delay experiments with the PGG.  They fail to replicate the “intuitive cooperation” results of 
Rand and colleagues, including the claim that intuitive contribution can be attributed to behavior 
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outside of the laboratory environment.  The results call attention to the validity of self-reports, 
previous PGG experience, time intervals between PGG participations, and the structure of the 
game itself.  Tinghog et al. (2013) also test the validity of a Rand experiment in which they 
obtain different results from the original study, a time-pressure/time-delay experiment in which 
Rand et al. report increased cooperation for subjects who complete the PGG under time pressure.  
Two flaws in this design were identified in the Tinghog article, the first being that excluding 
subjects who fail to make a decision in the allotted time cause a selection problem.  The second, 
related flaw was that the original authors incorrectly control for subjects who met or did not meet 
the time requirement.   
Thus, accurate interpretation of reaction time data in the decision science literature 
remains crucial as authors continue to utilize RT variables as a proxy for dual-system models 
within their specific domains.  A recent study (Obrecht & Chesney, 2016) explores ‘deliberative 
failure’ by asking subjects to judge a specific scenario in which base-rate information and 
stereotype information support incongruent judgments.  The authors have a group of subjects 
evaluate statements that contain base-rate information, claiming that a limitation of their work is 
assumption that such evaluation prompts deliberation.  They go on to suggest that this might be 
confirmed by looking at reaction times. 
The domain of neuroeconomics certainly holds enormous potential as a future contributor 
to the development of dual-process theory.  Investigations of social preferences have been 
conducted using fMRI in scenarios involving prosociality (Decety et al 2004; Zaki & Mitchell, 
2011; Emonds et al, 2014; Kuss et al., 2015).  Several of these find significant activity in regions 
of the brain linked to subjective value, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC).  Further, results from the study by Kuss and colleagues indicate 
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increased activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) when selfish participants made 
non-costly social decisions.  The authors also report that while selfish participants usually were 
faster to decide in comparison to pro-socials, they did have increased RTs for the non-costly 
social decisions.  These results highlight the efficacy of neuroimaging studies in refining our 
current models of the choice process. 
 In summary, the use of RT data and dual-process models to analyze social dilemma 
paradigms has generated noticeable controversy.  Much of the conflict stems from the reverse 
inference claims explored here.  We have reconciled a portion of these results by correcting for 
subjective value differences across experiments via a standardized scale of prosociality.  This 
analysis provides a clear direction for future RT studies in the field of experimental economics.  
However, further work is required to explore similar trends in other game formats and using 
alternate incentive structures.  
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Appendix 
A1. Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2 | Public Goods Game format (adapted from Lotito et al., 2013) 
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A2. Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 3 | Social Value Orientation Slider. (Original diagram from Fiedler et al., 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
